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Educators have long been concerned with how to encourage children to become 
independent and critical thinkers. These skills are fundamental for successful 
participation in social communities but are often limited to poor forms of reasoning 
or constrained by social and emotional factors that may prevent independent and 
creative thinking in school, family or professional life (Muller-Mirza & Perret-
Clermont, 2009). In this chapter we will turn back to some aspects of the contribution 
of Piaget to the study of the development of independent thinking in children and 
revisit them in the light of dialogical perspectives. More precisely we will revisit the 
‘clinical’ or ‘critical’ interview he employed in his investigations of children’s 
cognitive competence. For Piaget, a child’s argument is the sign of a child’s thinking. 
In response to careful questioning, the child is prompted to provide reasoning and 
justification of concepts (such as the conservation of quantities). Piaget considered 
these as allowing access to the cognitive structures that support such thinking.  
With his critical interview Piaget inspired generations of psychologists in their search 
to understand the developing mind of an autonomous reasoned thinker. Over the 
decades since its original conception, the critical interview evolved into an empirical 
method to assess the child’s stage of cognitive development. We suggest that as a 
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result of this evolution, the critical interview method has neglected to account for the 
presence of social or contextual factors in these conversations. We propose that the 
child’s reasoning and argumentation cannot be cognitively isolated but must be 
considered as a co-construction between the child and the practices, objects, 
expectations and normative values of his2 interlocutors and social context. 
Through our re-visitation of this method, we hope to observe the socio-cognitive 
processes that may have been overlooked by Piaget and the subsequent reductionist 
evolution of his critical interview. In this study, we have taken steps to increase the 
likelihood that children enter into the discussion and we have confronted them, in the 
hope of stimulating contrasting opinions, or arguments. Throughout our observations 
and their subsequent analysis, we pay close attention to what we believe are the social 
dynamics in which the child’s discourse is nested. In doing so, we not only discover 
the fledging signs of logical reasoning and argumentation in children, but we 
highlight the importance of creating educational opportunities to develop socially and 
culturally nourished, autonomous thinking. 
Re-visiting the clinical interview 
In his early work, Piaget sought a means by which he could empirically observe the 
structures of children’s thinking through their judgments and reasoning (Shayer, 
2008). In order to access their reasoning, Piaget would engage children in 
conversation and confront them with different points of view. The method granted 
special importance to counter-suggestions as invitations to defend answers, allowing 
2 In conformity with the practice in Piaget's writings, the masculine form will be used to designate both 
boys and girls. We are aware that gender is a relevant dimension in the type of processes discussed here 
(Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) but has not been examined in the data referred to in the present chapter.	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him to assess the structure behind the child’s reasoning and not just the conformity of 
the isolated responses to the adult’s norms or expectations.  
Piaget (1926) described the critical interview as a method, also an art of questioning, 
which “aims at capturing what is hidden behind the immediate appearance of things. 
It analyzes down to its ultimate constituents the least little remark made by the young 
subjects” (pp.13-14).  
The critical interview method, used to identify the birth of knowledge in the child, 
consists of a dialogue between adult and child. Through questioning, the latter is 
encouraged to verbally express his reasoning process through arguments that support 
judgments (Bovet, 1974). Piaget’s aim was that the observer could not only see how 
the child understands and responds, but also by what means he explains the statements 
he makes. Piaget suggested that the acquisition of scientific concepts, such as the 
conservation of quantities, requires action, reflection and decentration (the ability to 
consider the perspective of another). This capacity to consider the views of ‘the other’ 
he considered as one of the foundations to creative thinking, to building on the ideas 
of others and generating alternatives and hypotheses. 
Evolution of the Piagetian Interview 
In search of guidance for the methodological approach for our study, we returned to 
Piaget’s early descriptions of the clinical interview (Piaget & Szeminska, 1941). 
Piaget, in fact, gave little by way of detailed description of his method. We find his 
original ‘conversation’ between adult and child to be both informal and exploratory. 
Indeed, it seems almost playful in contrast to the systematic tests of conservation that 
have subsequently been adapted for replicable, scientific measures of psychological 
constructs. We discovered considerable differences between Piaget’s original 
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approach and the procedures reported in subsequent empirical studies. 
Although, perhaps of anecdotal relevance to the present study but demonstrating the 
importance of collaborators in the development of a researcher's thinking, we 
speculate that this evolutionary journey began with one of Piaget’s closest 
collaborators: Bärbel Inhelder, who may have been the first to use the conservation 
test as a diagnostic tool in her research on developmental stages and delays in young 
children (Inhelder, 1943). More than 20 years later, and after volumes of empirical 
investigations of conservation had been published, concern for improving consistency 
in task design and testing procedures resulted in the development of a psychometric 
scale of conservation called the Concept Assessment Kit (Goldschmidt & Bentler, 
1968). What had initially been described as an ‘interview,’ was now an ‘experiment,’ 
‘children’ became ‘participants’ and their verbal responses to transformations of 
volume, area, length and weight were given numerical values and rated on a scale. 
Thus providing “a greater measure of consistency and statistical accuracy into the 
research on conservation” (Goldschmidt & Bentler, 1968, p.788). 
In what was perhaps a pivotal moment of departure from Piaget’s original conception 
of the interview, Goldschmidt and Bentler separated the child’s behavior (judgment of 
conservation or non-conservation) from their explanation (reasoning), suggesting that 
behavior is an equally adequate measure of assessing conservation. Yet Piaget would 
argue unequivocally that it is the comprehension or explanation of the child’s 
reasoning that must be assessed and distinguished from a mere belief, in order to 
determine a child’s level of mastery of the concept of conservation (Inhelder, Bovet, 
Sinclair & Smock, 1966).  
McGarrigle and Donaldson (1975) suggest that procedures employed to assess 
conservation can underestimate the child’s knowledge. Even when conversations 
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during the clinical interview are allowed to remain open and unpredictable, even if the 
experimenter can control the here and now of the interaction at every stage, defining 
the problem and deciding which objects and attributes of objects are going to be the 
focus for attention, the experimental manipulations are "contrived for the purpose of 
engendering specific kinds of opportunities for cognitive changes with specific kind of 
individuals" (Maynard, 2009, pp.315-316).  
The clinical interview is a complex method to interact with children. Even Piaget 
recognized the difficulty in interviewing children: “it is so hard not to talk too much 
when questioning a child… it is so hard not to be suggestive… the good experimenter 
must, unite two often incompatible qualities: he must know how to observe, to let the 
child talk freely, without ever checking or side-tracking his utterance and at the same 
time he must constantly be alert for something definitive” (Piaget, 1929, p.9). 
With such complexity and without clear, procedural instructions for the 
administration of his method, it is little wonder that psychologists have attempted to 
create a standardized test to investigate Piaget’s theories. However, we believe that 
over several decades of evolution, the conversational and dialogical character of his 
method has been subsumed by reductionist psychology in search of behavioral and 
cognitive explanations. Piaget (1927, 1929) himself suggested the clinical interview 
was to be a qualitative description, rather than explained through numerical counts 
and standardized tests. This disparity between its original conception and subsequent 
empirical evolution, has lead some researchers to question whether psychologists can 
in fact claim to be assessing the same thinking processes that Piaget originally 
conceived (Bond & Tryphon, 2009). 
Thus, we have returned to the critical interview, as we believed it was originally 
conceived: “in chase of the ever-receding thought, drives it from cover, pursues it and 
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tracks it down till it can seize it, dissect it and lay bare the secret of its composition” 
(Piaget, 1926, pp.13-14). As will be evident from our report, the focus of our attention 
is not on the child’s judgment of conservation but on the arguments, explanation and 
reasoning he provides to support or re-enforce his judgment. In doing so, we respect 
Piaget’s hypothesis about the logical structures of the child’s thoughts and his 
statements as a sign of them. Whilst we may have had reasons to question this 
premise (Perret-Clermont, 1993), we have put these aside in order to distinguish 
between surface thinking and deeper thinking.  
In contrast to Piaget however, and with the benefit of decades of research since he 
first justified his method, we will explore children's thinking, through a social and 
dialogical lens. We believe that reasoning and argumentation cannot be considered in 
a cognitive vacuum, free from past experience, conversations and context. Nor do we 
feel that social dialogue only occurs in the physical presence of another (Piaget, 
1926). From this perspective, explained in more detail below, the beliefs and 
understandings of individuals are enriched by the internalised ‘voices’ of others 
(Bakhtin, 1930/1981). We explore examples, from our interviews, of how children 
display their thinking in connection to certain context and activity; between the child 
and his relationships to persons and objects in social life and in the school 
environment.  
Dialogical interaction and the critical interview 
Different studies (Hundeide, 1992; Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989; Rommetveit, 
1985) have demonstrated how a socio-cognitive framework, attentive to 
communication processes, may contribute to the understanding of children’s 
performance in Piagetian tasks. Assuming a dialogical conception of the interaction 
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during Piagetian interviews, the individual “conduct” constructed through discussion 
and social interactions, can be understood only in relation to the interlocutors and the 
activity context in which it occurs. The Piagetian interview implies a communicative 
interaction between three components: the subject, the interlocutor and the object of 
discourse. It is mediated by semiotic means, and each participant establishes a 
personal relationship with each of these elements (Chapman, 1991; Psaltis, Duveen & 
Perret-Clermont, 2009; Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish & Psaltis, 2007).  
Early research on acquiescence (Rose & Blank, 1974) and on children’s 
understanding of Piagetian tasks when put in context via different narratives 
(Donaldson, 1978; Light, Buckingham & Robbins, 1979; Light, Gorsuch & 
Newmann, 1987), demonstrate how the child’s role is not only to answer but also to 
consider the intention of the adult and to behave accordingly in a socially adequate 
way. The child tries to interpret the frame of the activity (Ginsburg, 1997) and 
differences between the interpretations of adult and child on the premise of the task 
are likely. 
Pramling (2006) highlights the relevance of studying the meta-communicative 
elements during Piagetian interviews, through which children demonstrate their 
communicative competence alongside their efforts to be understood through the eyes 
of the adult. This suggestion is also present in a study conducted by Aronsson and 
Hundeide (2002) in which the concept of “relational rationality” indicates how the 
children’s answers are built in a specific context that participants have to take into 
account. Piaget referred to logical structures that serve both as a means to assess the 
difficulty of the task and to interpret the psychological processes that are assumed to 
take place when the task is being solved. The difficulty of a task as experienced by the 
individual and how he copes with it in the particular situation, cannot be simply 
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reduced to an analysis of the logical structure of the problem. Through a detailed 
analysis of the participants’ conversations, it may be possible to identify how the 
child’s understanding of the task is bound by different interpretative premises in 
relation to the task itself and the co-construction during conversation (Marro Clément, 
1999; Marro Clément, Trognon, & Perret-Clermont, 1999).  
This exploratory and interpretative approach is one that is supported by the dialogical 
framework in which we widen our investigation beyond Piaget’s narrow focus on the 
logics of children’s thinking, in anticipation and acknowledgement of the alternative 
perspectives of others (Rommetveit, 2003). Furthermore, dialogical interpretations 
consider the meaning of the dialogue within the particular institutional setting; in this 
case the school and classroom, where interpretations of the task and surrounding 
conversations can be considered relative to the values and social practices of the 
cultural institution (Mercer, 2004).  
A dialogical framework helps us to identify tensions between different spaces, 
temporalities, and identities of participants (Markova, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar 
Orvig, 2007), and become aware of the co-construction of meaning, the 
multivoicedness (Bakhtin, 1930/1981) of a communicative situation, and the context 
as an implicit constituent to the participant’s conversation.  
Participation in dialogue increases the need for specific kinds of knowledge and in 
particular, knowledge of an influence on others’ thoughts and actions. Dialogue 
requires that we consider alternative perspectives, often diverse, multiple and complex 
(Bebbington, Brown, Frame & Thomson, 2007). As suggested by Wegerif (in this 
volume), in a dialogue the boundary between people engaged in conversation is not a 
demarcation line but an inclusive space within which the self and the other mutually 
construct and reconstruct each other.  
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The dialogical approach allows us to develop a deeper understanding of how humans 
interact and co-operate in social situations. To adopt a dialogical approach demands a 
consideration of these social situations as a plurality of perspectives, trajectories of 
discourse, and signs (Grossen, 2009). Furthermore, we are interested in the 
development of opportunities for individual participation “in a dialogic process that 
continually shapes and reshapes the self and others” (Barge & Little, 2002, p.383). 
According to this dialogical perspective, we can assume as object of the analysis the 
interaction as a whole: the context is thus perceived not as an external element, but is 
constructed by the active interpretation of participants (Tartas, Baucal & Perret-
Clermont, 2010). Thus, in our goal to stimulate dialogue through critical interview 
discussions, we hope to better understand the socio-cognitive dynamics influencing 
these dialogues. Our hypothesis is that children’s reasoning is not just a measure of 
their cognitive thinking but is constructed by social processes such as: the questions 
and expectations of the adult, the influence of peers, the cultural values and scripts of 
the institution and the child’s individual, autonomous thinking. 
Analytical Approach 
As has been stated, we believe the exclusive attention to the logical structures of the 
child’s thoughts and to his statements as a sign of them, led Piaget to underestimate 
the social and conversational dynamics involved in his method and particularly in this 
conservation of liquids task (Perret-Clermont, 1993; Arcidiacono & Perret-Clermont, 
2009, 2010). Arguments in conversation are part of a co-construction of the specific 
setting (Greco, 2009; Perret-Clermont, 2006; Rigotti & Rocci, 2006). In every 
interaction, the speaker’s identity is at stake, and many social elements need to be 
managed: emotions, vulnerability, status and expectations of the self and of others, 
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available semiotic means, goals of the activity, and so on. Thus, our challenge, in 
widening the lens (Zittoun & Perret-Clermont, 2009) to acknowledge these important 
emotional and social processes, is to both understand and consider how to manage the 
design of settings that can promote learning in such interactions. 
In the course of our observations, we discovered the dialogues were often very limited. 
Our participants seemed reluctant to express their opinions and evidence of supportive 
reasoning was rarely present. Whilst we were conscious of developmental explanations 
that might suggest our participants may not have acquired the semiotic language or 
cognitive operations in which to engage in a scientific discussion of liquid 
conservation, we became aware of the socio-emotional tensions that suggest their 
developmental trajectory was not the only explanation for the reluctance of children to 
express their reasoning.  
We have taken an inductive and reflective approach to analyzing our observations. As 
will be seen, we discover, from our analysis of his conversation, that the child is 
indeed an active thinker but that his previous experiences and conversations, his 
beliefs and concerns for the perspective and needs of others, are all present in his 
dialogue. In our search for a framework to help us analyze and understand the 
cognitive, social and emotional processes that might help us explain such influences, 
we turn to the perspective of Bakhtin. 
Although the notions of external and internal dialog were introduced from his 
perspective of philosophy and literature, Bakhtin’s description of the dialogic process 
of interaction has attracted psychologists interested in children’s linguistic and 
cognitive development. Some interesting studies (for example Junefelt, 2007; 
Wertsch, 1991) have used a combination of Piagetian, Vygotskian & Bakhtinian 
perspectives to identify different dialogic voices in the utterances of young children. 
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Other studies (Fisher, 2007; Hardman & Delafield, 2010) have illustrated how socio-
cultural context impacts dialogue in whole class teaching and learning where students 
have been trained in a ‘community of inquiry.’ A discussion of some of these 
methodological approaches used in psychology and dialogue can be found in Grossen 
(2010). 
Our approach is perhaps closest to Bakhtin’s (1930/1981, 1986) theoretical position of 
dialogues as a community of different and perhaps conflicting voices. Hermans 
brought together James’ (1890) theory on the ‘self’ with Bakhtin’s metaphor of 
multivoicedness, suggesting that people, as authors, occupy many positions in a multi-
voiced self (Hermans, 2001a). As Bakhtin referred to the ‘I’ and ‘other’ as voices 
within the self, James similarly distinguishes between the relatively autonomous ‘I’: 
self-as-knower, and a collective social ‘Me’: self-as-known. In a stream of thought, as 
in a musical symphony, multiple voices accompany and oppose one another in 
dialogical ways.  
Hermans and Kempen (1995) stress that, in order to arrive at a developmental theory of 
the dialogical self, it is necessary to combine a multiplicity of voices or ‘positions.’ On 
this advice and after in-depth analysis of our data, we believe we have identified a 
number of different dialogical I and Me voices, which we have collected into two 
categories. These we have tentatively named: a) in-formed thinking and b) co-formed 
thinking.  
These categories arose from the interpretations from within our data, where a) we 
believe the child demonstrates an obligation to comply with relational and contextual 
expectations and norms (co-formed thinking), whilst b) simultaneously trying to voice 
his identity as own self and author: his ideas, creativity and knowledge (in-formed 
thinking). These we derived from an analysis of the explicit utterances, together with 
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associated gestures observable in our transcripts. We acknowledge the exploratory 
nature of our interpretations, which we hope will create a stimulus for future discussion 
and research. 
Methodological Approach 
In contrast to what might be expected from reading Piaget, in our initial interviews we 
found little evidence of critical discussion and argumentation. Children seemed 
reluctant to contradict and oppose the adult-experimenter or one another. Thus, we 
made a number of adaptations to increase the likelihood that children became active 
participants in the discussion. We begin the following section with a reminder of the 
liquid conservation task. We then describe the steps that we took to increase the 
likelihood that children enter into the dialogue, express their opinions and provide 
supportive reasoning. Instead of relying on face-to-face interviews between the adult 
and the child, similarly as Perret-Clermont (1980), we have organized a sharing 
activity. 
Procedure 
In four different primary schools in Switzerland and England, we invited 104 children 
aged between 5 and 7 years, to participate in discussions of a liquid conservation task. 
Interviews were conducted by the experimenter, each one lasting no more than 20 
minutes and were held in a separate room adjacent to the classroom. Dialogues were 
video- and voice- recorded to ensure students’ reactions were captured. The 
experimenter and the children were seated at the same table. Children were introduced 
to a number of glasses or cups of different shapes (see Figure 1). At the beginning, 
two identical cups (A and A’) were filled to the same level, and the child was asked 
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whether each contained the same amount of juice. Once the child had agreed there 
was the same volume of juice in each (sometimes after adding a few additional 
drops), the content of one (cup A’) was poured into a smaller, larger cup (C). The 
child was then asked whether the two cups (A and C) still contained the same quantity 
of liquid. In previous clinical interviews, we also used another taller and thinner cup 
(B). However during our initial trials, we found that the introduction of a fourth cup 
had a negative effect on the participant’s contribution to the dialogue, perhaps due to 
the added complexity for children in this age group. To minimize this negative effect, 
in later trials we used only three cups (A, A’ and C).  
A A’     B 
After a pilot study, we took the following steps to increase discussion and 
argumentation between participants: 
1) the experimenter was introduced to the participants using first names. It was
hoped that this would provide some disassociation from the classroom
authority or teacher figure, with the intention of reducing the effect of
relationship-asymmetry. In addition, the experimenter made every attempt to
address each child by name when inviting them to contribute to the discussion;
2) children were grouped with their peers in dyads or triads;
3) children were invited to actively participate in the process of pouring and
transferring liquid from one glass to another. It was anticipated that involving
A A’ C 
 
Figure 1: set of glasses 
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the children in the physical transformation of the juice, contributed to their 
engagement and persistence with the task and may also have provoked or 
supported their thinking process; 
4) in order to create a scene that is familiar and accessible to our young
participants, we presented three soft toys that were each assigned to one of the
three glasses (Light, Buckingham & Robbins, 1979; McGarrigle & Donaldson,
1975). The children were invited to imagine that the toys were at a birthday
party drinking juice from the different glasses. The three toys expressed three
different opinions, which also at times, encouraged children who were less
likely to express their own opinion. In particular: soft toy opinion 1: I have the
same amount of juice in my cup as the others; soft toy opinion 2: I have more
juice than the others; soft toy opinion 3: I have less juice than the others;
5) a common teaching strategy in schools (and one that we believe is therefore
familiar to the children) is that the teacher models - usually with the class’s
participation - a demonstration of the lesson’s objective. We wanted to
confront children with different perspectives. We used the initial stage of
liquid equalization as an opportunity for children to experience each other’s
contrasting opinions and during this first stage of the discussion, we
encouraged participants to agree or disagree on whether the volume of juice
was equally shared between cups A and A’. In many trials, several minutes
were spent coming to an agreement on whether the volume of liquid was
equally shared. We felt this provided a ‘lesson demonstration’ of the type of
dialogue we hoped children would enter, thus facilitating a transition towards
a discussion of the next phase of the experimentation;
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6) participants were given several opportunities to ‘disagree:’ first with the initial
sharing of quantities and later, when the third container was presented.
Furthermore, the experiment was repeated in order to provide the participants
with several opportunities to observe and reflect on the transformations. The
content of C was poured back into A’ and the child was asked the same
question concerning A and A.’ By presenting several opportunities to argue,
and each time, encouraging participants to express different opinions, it was
hoped that the children may have been more ready to contribute to the
dialogue.
Where necessary, interactions are transcribed3 in both the original language and the 
English translation. The names of the children have been changed to ensure 
anonymity. The adult-experimenter is noted as ‘Exp’. 
Findings 
Derived from the analysis of the dialogic voices within our data, we have grouped our 
findings into two categories: In-formed thinking and Co-formed thinking. Within each 
of these categories we identified recurring themes from our analysis, presented below, 
together with our theoretical justifications. Each theme is illustrated by examples from 
our transcripts. 
In-formed thinking 
We believe in-formed thinking can be expressed through a sense of personal identity, 
distinctness and volition (James, 1890). Piaget, Inhelder & Szeminska (1948/1973) 
spoke of autonomous thinking, which they defined as the ability to be self-governing, 
3 For transcription codes, refer to appendix 1. 
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to think for oneself and to decide between right and wrong, between truth and untruth, 
by relying on action in reality, evidence and reflection (Kamii, Clark, & Dominik, 
1994). We consider the in-formed thinker to be the self-as-knower, the author that 
demonstrates what he can and wants to remember in response to reflections and 
emotions that subjectively guide what he cares to remember or take an interest in.  
Authorship and initiative: Mead (1934) refers to a “sense of freedom, of initiative” 
(pp.177-178), which we believe guides in-formed thinking. We found an enthusiasm, 
among our participants, to express such ideas and initiative as well as claim their 
ownership. Often, such an utterance would begin with a linguistic marker such as “I 
think,” used to express an individual's suggestion or opinion. Where this view point 
was contradictory to another, children would signal their disagreement with a “no” or 
a contradictory “yes but…” We suggest these linguistic antecedents signal the child’s 
ownership of independent opinion or ideas. In particular, when the child is facing 
opposition from another, in demonstration of the freedom and initiative that Meade 
refers to above, is thus a representation of in-formed thinking.  
To illustrate, we present two examples from our data of children offering a suggestion 
for how to share the juice equally amongst cups of different shapes and sizes.  
Excerpt 1 
181 Vincent moi, je sais, il faut 
reverser un peu dans 
celui-là ((A)) et un peu 
dans celui-là ((A’)) 
aussi.  
me, I know, we must tip a 
little in that one there 
((A)) and a little in 
that one there ((A’)) as 
well.  
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Excerpt 2 
129 Charlotte stop. attends, je sais 
comment on peut regarder. 
euh, il faut prendre un 
peu moins que ça. 
((égalise A, A’ et C une 
fois encore)) c’est bon! 
stop. wait, I know how we 
can see. err, we must take 
a little less from that. 
((equalizes A, A’ and C 
once again)) it’s right! 
In these examples we see Charlotte and Vincent proposing a solution to solving the 
problem of equalization across the different containers. Similarly, other children took 
the initiative to spontaneously incorporate vocabulary and concepts that suggested an 
ability to connect the present discussion to a previous context or experience. For 
example, participants often incorporated vocabulary (i.e.: ‘measure,’ ‘test,’ and 
‘ruler)’ that most likely would have been introduced and explicitly taught in the 
classroom. 
 It is likely that in primary school, students will have been introduced to containers 
that allow for accurate measures of capacity using a volumetric scale and it is 
memories of such vocabulary that children may have retained and are able to recall 
and connect (even imperfectly) to the present discussion. In an alternative 
interpretation, we also acknowledge that these behaviors could be understood as co-
formed: in such a school setting, children may draw on prior experience of their role 
as learners, keen to meet the adults' expectations that what has been taught previously 
and should be re-used in subsequent lessons even if they may not use the vocabulary 
appropriately. 
Deci (1995) and Deci, Koestner and Ryan (2001) have emphasized the importance for 
children to have a sense of choice and volition, to behave in accordance with their 
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own interests and values. This is illustrated in the extract below, whereby Jack 
spontaneously initiates a discussion in which he identifies a relationship between the 
liquid containers used in our experiment and his experience of drinking from a 
flexible juice carton (perhaps it is useful to imagine a drinking carton with a straw). 
Excerpt 3 
73 Jack it’s just because that cup’s wider ((gestures C)) 
and those cups ((gestures A and A’)) are smaller, 
there ((A and A’)) the juice gets squashed up. when 
I squash things to actually drink, ((demonstrates a 
holding and squeezing action with his hands)) it 
goes up. ((motions his pointed finger in an upward 
direction)) 
74 Exp when do you squash things to drink? 
75 Jack well, when I can’t get them. 
76 Exp what do you use? what are you squashing? 
77 Jack errr (.) a Lucozade Sport (.) it’s quite hard. 
78 Exp a Lucozade Sport. you squash it up and what happens? 
79 Jack it comes out. ((smiles)) 
Jack describes, with active gestures to reinforce his explanation, how in order to get 
the remaining juice from the carton, he squashes the carton between his fingers and in 
response, the liquid moves upwards and out of the container. This vertical motion he 
likens to that of the narrow containers (A and A’) and hence for him, reinforces the 
reasons for why it appears that there is more juice in these thinner cups. Such an 
autonomous and spontaneous recollection of a prior experience we propose, 
demonstrates Jack’s in-formed thinking through his volitional reinterpretation of his 
own lived experience into the present context. 
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Curiosity and wonder: “A child’s curiosity is an astonishing source of energy” (Deci, 
1995, p. 18). We believe the in-formed thinker may display an impulsive response 
(Turner, 1999) to stimuli that attracts his attention. Given the age of our young 
participants, it is unsurprising that we frequently observed their impulsive, playful 
behaviour in our data. Children were found to initiate imaginative, pretend 
conversations between the soft toys involved in our experiment and at times became 
playfully preoccupied with the frequent repetition of liquid pouring from cup to cup, 
the response to which ranged from intent concentration in one interview, to shrieks of 
laughter in another.  
It is suggested that a capacity for curiosity begins in wonder, spontaneous play and 
experimentation of ideas (Fisher, 2007; Hardman & Delafield, 2010). In the excerpt 
below, three participants have been discussing whether each of the cups (A, A’ and C) 
have the same amount of juice. The largest cup (C) has been filled, almost to its 
capacity, much to the delight of the children, two of which take turns to wrap their 
hands around the cup as if to measure its capacity through their active gestures. Ben 
has watched this process and initiates the following exchange. 
Excerpt 4 
43 Rhona there’s so more than that much ((puts both hands 
around cup C)) 
44 Ben you’ve got big HANDS! ((laughs, then bends down to 
the level of the table as if to take a closer look 
at the hands through the cup)) 
45 Rhona do I? 
46 Ben if you look through there, look through there 
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((stands up to point to the side of the cup nearest 
to Rhona, then returns, seated, to his table level 
view)) 
It may be that Ben does not fully understand why Rhona’s hands, seen through the 
glass and the liquid have appeared magnified, but in this moment he is full of wonder, 
curiosity and humour. Stepping in the footprints of Dewey (1916) and Claparède 
(1931), we suggest that this impulsive curiosity is the forethought for developing 
questioning and new thinking and we believe that there are strong connections 
between in-formed, autonomous thinking, using the child’s natural and spontaneous 
curiosity, interests and creativity as fuel for inquiry and intellectual growth. 
Withdrawal: As soon we enter a dialogue we make ourselves known to others. We 
found that during moments of the conversation where a difference of opinion was 
being discussed, many participants would withdraw from the discourse or refuse to 
contribute to the discussion. If children feel any vulnerability in their individual 
opinions, by withdrawing they may have somehow been able to protect their 
vulnerable independent ideas. It could be argued that individuals simply did not have 
a point of view about the task, were not motivated or perhaps did not fully understand 
the meaning of the discussion. However, we repeatedly observed individuals who by 
their behavior, appeared to strongly disagree with a claim but refused to provide 
supporting reasoning. Equally, we observed how some children may have adopted a 
playful frame from which they were able to securely enjoy the activity without 
experiencing a challenge to their thinking. Perhaps, in situations where the child 
exercises his right not to enter the discussion, he is in fact demonstrating the 
distinctness and independence of the in-formed thinker. 
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Mead (1934) explored the roles that children learn to take when they play. He 
suggested that through play, children learn to consider the roles of others. Through 
their early, invented games, children begin to imagine how someone else thinks and 
feels; they begin to anticipate how that person will act. Humour, games and 
imaginative pretending have been found to fundamentally contribute to knowledge 
generation (Whitebread, 2004). In exercising this desire to withdraw or playfully 
escape a conversation, we interpret this as in-formed thinking. Furthermore we agree 
that in-formed thinkers, should indeed be entitled not to speak, or indeed to at least 
request thinking time before being required to express their views and reasoning about 
problems that require challenging thinking. Providing opportunities to play, within the 
learning environment may support in-formed thinking and promote learning. 
Isolated thinking: In a few examples we found a kind of independent thinking that 
was extreme in its isolation from the norms and expectations of the other participants 
and the adult-experimenter taking part in the activity. In one example a child 
repeatedly expressed his desire to drink the juice in the containers. This was 
illustrated by his repeated claim: “I’m thirsty.” He became only interested in drinking 
the juice and showed no desire to engage in the discussion with the group. When it 
became clear to him that he would be required to wait for a drink of juice, he detached 
himself from the discussion, got up and removed himself from the group. We believe 
we observed an independence of thought in some of our participants that perhaps 
demonstrated a difficulty in imagining the world through someone else’s eyes and 
responding appropriately to others feelings. Although we have categorised this within 
our in-formed thinker category, in fact, we believe that children who find it difficult to 
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see the perspective of others may find it harder to further develop this autonomous in-
formed thinking. 
The co-formed thinker 
James (1890) refers to the social self: “a man has as many social selves as there are 
individuals who recognize him” (p. 294). It seems that these different social selves are 
not isolated in themselves but can be linked through dialogical interpretations in the 
multivoiced self (Hermans, 2001b). Furthermore, social roles are interconnected to 
the expectations of the institutions they exist within (Turner, 1999). Mead (1934) 
speaks of the social self - the organized set of attitudes expected by the other, which 
an individual assumes. We define the co-formed thinker as one who tries to respond 
to expectations without critique, taking little responsibility, obedient or submissive 
and sometimes even unswervingly loyal to the obligations of the interlocutor, social 
group or institutional context. The co-formed thinker seems externally inspired, 
regulated or governed by the values, beliefs and ideas of others. He is thus not only 
concerned with but also dependent on how successfully (or not) he influences the 
judgment of others for his self-as-known. In our interviews, we experienced many 
examples of what we have termed ‘co-formed thinking.’ 
Detatched opinion: Feeling judged in relation to values and social norms of their 
schools, classrooms and peer groups, children will attempt to influence these 
judgements (Goffman, 1967). We believe that we can see evidence of a vigilance in 
the children we interviewed, concerned with managing and defending their public 
self. 
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We observed children that expressed their judgments of conservation or non-
conservation but avoided expressing explicit ownership of their thinking through the 
omission of antecedents such as ‘I think’. For example: “[…] c’est de la même taille, 
mais sauf il est plus grand le verre” (“[…] it is the same size, but except the glass is 
bigger”). Without the linguistic marker of ownership and in contrast to what we 
described previously, it seems that somehow authorship is made implicit, and ideas 
are presented without confronting the opposing viewpoint and indeed are less 
personal. It is possible that children felt some discomfort in disagreement with their 
peers and in managing their reputation, or out of concern for how the other may react 
they somehow detach themselves from their statements. Equally, these utterances are 
perhaps examples of what children feel they ought to say, given the contextual 
expectations, co-formed thinking that is perhaps not truly indicative of their own 
volition. 
Unstable judgements: We became aware of children who repeatedly changed their 
standpoint throughout the duration of the interview. Sometimes this was in response 
to questioning from the experimenter. As demonstrated by Rose (1973), a child who 
provides a first answer but then is asked by the experimenter to confirm his answer, 
may believe his response is being questioned and perhaps needs to be changed. The 
repeated question is “an implicit communicative sign that the first answer is wrong, 
or that the child should think again to find a better answer” (Baucal and Stepanović, 
2006, p. 260). We suspect that in our desire to encourage the child to confirm and 
reinforce his reasoning with supporting arguments, we may have led the child to 
think that he had not met our expected response to initial questioning. We became 
aware of this during the course of our analysis, in observations of a girl who 
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demonstrated an unstable response to the experimenters repeated questions. 
Eventually she withdraws her contribution to the discussion: “moi je pense les deux, 
ça m’est égal” (“I think both, it makes no difference to me”). Somehow it seems she 
has lost sight of her own thinking and perhaps she realises she doesn’t know whether 
there is the same amount of liquid in A and C. It seems her preference is to 
understand and respond co-operatively to the experimenters expectations for her 
answers to be ‘correct’ according to the perspective of the adult-authority in the room 
and perhaps, after this repeat questioning she eventually gives up her guesswork. 
In another example of unstable judgement, a single participant can be observed taking 
turns to agree with each of the different opinions of two other children. By the end of 
the interview, Samuel changed his opinion four times. Each time, he switches his 
judgment after the contrary view of one of the other participants has been voiced, 
suggesting that he prefers to be in accord with his peers than in opposition. We 
suggest this type of co-formed thinking is one that is concerned with obedience to 
authority and regulated by others. Piaget (1932) describes this as “heteronomy,” a 
characteristic that he considers typical of the pre-operational children at the heart of 
our study. Our concern is that the co-formed thinker is not able to demonstrate trust 
in, or take ownership of his own thinking. 
Expressing authority: Bakhtin (1981) refers to the ‘authoritative voice’ demonstrated 
through an asymmetrical superior dialogue that may intend to exercise control over 
another inferior or novice. In one of our interviews, Emma and Elizabeth have been 
left alone to discuss whether there is a ‘fair’ or equal share of juice in all three cups. 
Elizabeth has made several attempts to convince Emma that each of the cups already 
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has an equal share and has reminded Emma of the process that they had already 
witnessed to establish this. However, Emma is still in disagreement. 
Excerpt 5 
56 Elizabeth yeah! it will be fair (.) like last time like we just 
did (.) ‘cos remember you said that wouldn’t be 
enough (.) but when we poured it back in there ((C)) 
(.) it was the same wasn’t it? 
57 Emma Yeah 
58 Elizabeth so do you think- do you think it will work? 
59 Emma ((audible deep breath)) no (.) I think that ((C)) got 
a little bit (.) and that ((A’)) got a big giant bit 
like that ((indicates the levels)) 
 (3.0) 
60 Elizabeth ((looks at the cups, then away and up to the window)) 
61 Emma what you think? 
62 Elizabeth well, we have to do it quite (.) ((looking towards 
the door where the experimenter is outside)) a bit 
more quickly now because err: we only have like three 
minutes left 
63 Emma yeah 
64 Elizabeth ok so (.) quickly 
In turn 62, Elizabeth takes the role of timekeeper. In this move, she attempts to take 
leadership and organisation of the interaction (i.e. authority) through pointing out that 
there is a time limit on their discussion: “[…] we only have like 3 minutes left.” And 
again in turn 64: “ok so (.) quickly.” It seems that she has abandoned hope of 
convincing her partner through her explanations. She expresses her authority on these 
matters: and in doing so, she does not demonstrate any doubt that her own position 
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may be wrong. If she had done this and perhaps begun to consider the alternative 
perspective, could she have opened up a “thinking space” (Perret-Clermont, 2005) for 
Emma’s reciprocal doubt of her own opinion, without which the learning opportunity 
may be lost? In her adopted role as ‘manager’ of the dialogue, she is able to apply an 
alternative time pressure - perhaps somewhat manipulative - to convince her partner 
to reach a consensus so that the discussion can be drawn to a close. 
In a more overt demonstration of authority, we see Victor and Valentin in the example 
below: 
Excerpt 6 
108 Valentin puis que ici ((C)) il y a 
un petit peu trop de 
sirop. il faut aller 
jusque là. ((indique sur 
le verre C où le niveau 
devrait être)) 
and here ((C)) there is a 
little too much juice. we 
must go till here. 
((indicates where the 
level should be in glass 
C)) 
109 Victor mais c’est la même chose. 
si je te dis. 
but it is the same thing. 
if I tell you. 
110 Monkey 
(Exp) 
donc on aurait tous les 
deux la même chose à 
boire? 
so you would have both the 
same thing to drink? 
111 Victor oui. parce que celui-là 
((C)) il est maigre et 
celui-là ((A)) il est 
plus arrondi. 
Yes. because that one 
((C)) is thin and that one 
((A)) it is more rounded. 
112 Valentin ((se couvre les yeux des 
mains)) 
((covers his eyes with his 
hands)) 
113 Monkey 
(Exp) 
ah comment il faut faire, 
Valentin? 
ah what must be done, 
Valentin? 
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114 Valentin mmh. mmh. 
115 Victor c’est juste, je te dis. it is right, I tell you. 
Here, Victor seems sure of his thinking and in his attempts to convince Valentin, he 
tries to establish himself as the authority of the discussion: “but (.) it is the same thing. 
if I tell you” (turn 109) and: “it is right, I tell you” (turn 115).  
Alexander (2005) suggests that the dominant discourse in classrooms is teacher-
fronted, monological and traditional. Mortimer and Scott (2003) refer to the 
‘authoritative’ approach in teaching dialogues. These authoritative approaches may be 
forms of dialogue that children have frequently experienced during their interactions 
with teachers or indeed in family situations. These examples from our participants 
may echo a form of authoritarian dialogue they have come to learn represents ‘truth’ 
or knowledge. Our concern is that co-formed thinking in young children may be 
reinforced by such authoritarian teaching dialogues and may discourage the student 
from seeking out new learning ‘truths’, and furthermore impair the students efforts to 
take responsibility for their own learning (Castle, 2004). 
Social Resolution: Throughout our interviews, we frequently observed the distinction 
made by Pérez & Mugny (1996) and Buchs & al. (2008) between a “cognitive” and 
“social resolution.” In our data, we observed a preference for ‘resolving’ 
disagreements through social means, which are often prioritized in favour of the 
continued discussions of competing reasoning (cognitive resolution).  
Excerpt 7 
50 Dominic NO, because we need to put one ((more liquid)) in 
there ((A’)) 
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51 Samuel no! in there ((A)) 
52 Debbie ((to experimenter)) what do you think? 
53 Exp  what do I think? 
54 Dominic I really think ((we need to add more)) in that one, 
((A’)) ‘cos it is. 
55 Samuel I can see one drop higher. ((in A’)) If I go down- 
((puts his head down to the level of the liquid)) 
56 Exp ((to Debbie and Samuel)) this one ((A’)) you think is 
higher? 
57 Debbie one drop for all! ((points at all the glasses)) 
In the excerpt above, disagreement has sustained over several minutes. Debbie, who 
for the majority of the dialogue has opposed Dominic, can be observed, gradually 
through the course of the dialogue, refusing to answer the questions of the 
experimenter, perhaps a signal that she is withdrawing from the conversation. One 
can observe two attempts that she makes to resolve the discussion. The first (turn 52) 
is where she seeks to solicit the opinion of the experimenter asking: “what do you 
think?” It is suggested here that this is an appeal to the adult authority in the 
discussion, as a social solution for a final consensus and conclusion to the 
disagreement. In a further move (turn 57), after a sustained debate (only a portion of 
which is transcribed) between the two other boys regarding which glass should have 
more liquid added, she suggests that we “put one drop (of liquid) in all.” This is 
offered as a possible social solution again, by which the conflicting demands of all 
the participants could be avoided by having each partner "satisfied" with the granting 
of an equal drop to all. 
We suggest that the co-formed thinker in such a critical discussion, may be likely to 
prefer a social resolution at the cost of seeking a cognitive resolution to the problem 
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under discussion. This type of thinking – to a less correct judgment, or to an opinion 
that is no better than one’s own can be explained in terms of a desire for peer 
approval (Nelson & Aboud, 1985). We believe the children in this group, particularly 
in the case of Debbie, demonstrate their discomfort during sustained disagreement 
and may be seeking such approval from discussion partners. We suggest that in order 
for conversation to be interactive and dialogic, conflict and disagreement are likely to 
occur. In striving to reach a cognitive resolution through argumentative discussion, 
young people may well require an ability to manage the doubt and discomfort of such 
an experience. Our concern is how schools can teach students to recognize and 
manage these doubts during critical discussion. Not just to co-form their thinking in 
imitation and obedience of their teachers or peers with an uncritical trust of 
established knowledge. We would like to see knowledge taught as the debatable 
fruits of dialogical and empirical practices. 
Managing emotions 
In the critical interviews reported in this inquiry, we presented children with the 
opportunity to enter dialogues stimulated from opposing and conflicting opinions. 
Dewey (1938) identified the important role that educators have with empowering their 
students to become independent thinkers but raised concerns about the potential 
effects of controls in schools that can limit rather than promote the intellectual 
development of young people. We have seen evidence of a co-formed thinker who is 
at risk of loosing track of his own thinking through his concern for the needs and 
perspective of others. Equally, we have observed moments where in-formed thinkers 
have missed the opportunity to de-center and consider the needs and perspectives of 
others.  
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It should be emphasized that within the perspective of the dialogical approach, there 
are several possible interpretations for many of the examples we have provided above. 
We suggest that in-formed and co-formed thinking should be best understood along a 
continuum representing the autonomous, self-governed, in-formed thinker at one end 
of this scale, to the heteronymous, other-governed, co-thinker at the other. Whilst rare 
within the interviews we conducted, we are particularly interested in moments where 
the in-formed thinker meets and acknowledges the other's different point of view. In 
moments such as these, students engage in a collaborative thinking process and are 
able to demonstrate both independent, intimate thinking whilst managing to remain in 
contact with the “otherness” of a partner. 
We believe that children have the opportunity to learn through such co-operative 
dialogues through becoming aware and open to other perspectives, whilst retaining a 
well-defined sense of creative, autonomous and in-formed thinking that may stimulate 
what Mead (1934) called the “I” the “artist, the inventor, the scientist in his 
discovery” (p. 214). We are concerned that this is not frequently found in classrooms. 
In the interviews we conducted, we found evidence of one child who we believe 
manages to display and sustain such a balance of openness and autonomy.  
The two excerpts below are taken from our observation of two boys, Victor and 
Valentin. With particular focus on Valentin, we consider how he displays both co-
formed and in-formed thinking, together with the tensions that arise from managing 
the emotion that may accompany these two types of thinking.  
Victor has expressed strong reasoning and argument - he has been able to identify the 
different size and shape of the cups (turn 38 and 40) suggesting his belief that this 
gives the appearance of difference. Furthermore, he has reinforced his point (turn 53), 
by explaining the reversal of juice transfer from C to A. He has also tried to convince 
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Valentin, through taking an authority position as we saw earlier. Yet throughout the 
interaction, and in spite of Victor's efforts, Valentin maintains his disagreement and 
uncertainty.  
Excerpt 8 
34 Exp tu penses qu’il a raison 
petit singe ou pas? 
you think the little 
monkey is right or not? 
35 Valentin non. no. 
36 Exp tu lui expliques pourquoi 
non? 
can you explain to him 
why you say no? 
37 Valentin parce qu’il n’y a pas 
assez de sirop dans ce 
bocal ici ((montre du 
doigt le verre C)) et ici 
((A)) il y en a trop. ici 
il y en a trop ((A)) et 
là ((C)) il n’y en a pas 
assez. 
because there is not 
enough juice in the cup 
here ((pointing at glass 
C)) and here ((A)) there 
is too much. here there 
is too much ((A)) and 
there ((C)) is not 
enough. 
38 Victor non, non, c’est parce que 
celui-là ((C)) est plus 
gros que celui-là. ((A)) 
no, no, because that one 
((C)) is larger than that 
one. ((A)) 
39 Valentin mais non. ((baisse la 
tête et la cache dans son 
bras)) 
but no. ((head down and 
hidden in his arm)) 
40 Victor oui, il est plus maigre. yes, it is thinner. 
This interaction is unique within our data as Valentin, whilst daring to continue his 
opposition (turns 35 and 37), simultaneously signals his awareness that his knowledge 
is vulnerable. He demonstrates this doubt through his non-verbal gesture (turn 39) and 
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by repeatedly asking Victor “are you sure?” (turns 56 and 58).  
The non-verbal gesture is interesting. It occurs initially, when Valentin is faced, with 
Victor's contrasting opinion in turn 38: “no, no, because that one (C) is larger than 
that one (A).” Valentin responds with his own contradictory point of view: "but no" 
(turn 39). In what we have interpreted as a manifestation of his discomfort, Valentin 
then buries his head in arms folded on the table. A gesture that he repeats several 
times throughout the interview. 
Excerpt 9 
45 Monkey 
(Exp) 
explique-moi? explain to me? 
46 Victor parce que celui-là ((A)) 
il est maigre et celui-là 
((C)) il est gros. 
because that one ((A)) is 
thinner and that one ((C)) 
is bigger. 
47 Monkey 
(exp) 
tu es d’accord avec ce 
qu’il me dit? 
do you agree with what he 
said? 
48 Valentin non. no. 
49 Victor ((rire)) ((laughs)) 
50 Monkey 
(exp) 
mais alors expliquez-moi 
tous les deux pourquoi 
vous pensez ça. 
then explain to me why you 
both think that. 
51 Victor il faut de toute façon 
voir. 
we must see anyway. 
52 Monkey 
(Exp) 
comment on peut voir? how can we see? 
53 Victor il faut reverser ((C dans 
A’)) et on remet ça ((A’)) 
là-dedans. ((C)) 
we must pour ((C into A’)) 
and put back that ((A’)) 
into there. ((C)) 
54 Monkey montre-moi. ((tend à show me. ((gives Victor 
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(Exp) Victor le verre A’)) cup A’)) 
55 Victor ((verse C dans A’)) ((pour C into A’)) 
56 Valentin tu es sûr? are you sure? 
57 Victor il faut être sûr sûr sûr. 
((observe les verres A et 
A’)) et oui, c’est bien la 
même chose. 
we have to be sure sure 
sure. ((observes the 
glasses A et A’)) and yes, 
it's the same thing. 
58 Valentin ah oui, il manque juste 
une petite goutte, mais 
bon. tu es sûr? 
ah yes, but it lacks a 
little drop, but ok. are 
you sure? 
59 Victor c’est la même chose, c’est 
la même chose. 
it is the same thing, it 
is the same thing. 
60 Valentin ah mais oui. je pense que 
c’est comme ça en fait. 
ah but yes. I think it is 
like that in fact. 
In turn 58 we see that Valentin realises he may have been mistaken: “ah yes, but it 
lacks a little drop, but ok. are you sure?” He signals his openness to changing his 
viewpoint, though he asks Victor to be sure, as if requesting that Victor provides 
proof of his convictions. This is perhaps the moment at which Valentin begins to 
accept the idea that his knowledge may need to be modified, the point he appears to 
reach in turn 60: “ah but yes. I think it is like that in fact.” 
We speculate that Valentin is openly displaying the emotional artifacts of his 
vulnerability and doubt as he repeatedly hides his head in his arms. Despite this 
discomfort, he remains open. Both boys are engaged and participating throughout the 
interaction, at a level that was rarely observed across our corpus. We suggest that 
despite his discomfort and vulnerability, Valentin manages to remain open to the 
acquisition of new knowledge, whilst managing his negative emotional response. His 
words and accompanying behaviours we feel are represented in the following words 
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of Mikhail Bakhtin (1930/1981, p. 348): “The importance of struggling with another’s 
discourse, its influence on the history of an individual’s coming to ideological 
consciousness, is enormous. One’s own discourse and one’s own voice, although born 
of another or dynamically stimulated by another, will sooner or later liberate 
themselves from the authority of the other’s discourse.”  
As a result of a concern for complying with social expectations or to avoid the 
uncomfortable experience of making ‘mistakes,’ we have seen how hard it can be for 
children to ‘let go’ of their beliefs and open themselves up to the possibility that their 
thinking may require updating and re-constructing. We believe there is much we can 
learn from Valentin and wonder whether the new conclusion he reaches at the end of 
our conversation, is a sign of his coming to a new level of consciousness that Bakhtin 
refers to above. Certainly, Valentin has helped us to capture some of the tension that 
Bakhtin refers to. He not only experiences his emotion, he even seems prepared for 
others to see it. It is not easy for him, but despite his discomfort, or perhaps because 
of it, he remains open to learning.  
Discussion 
Independent, autonomous thinking was the dream of Piaget (1977): “What is the goal 
of education? Are we forming children who are only capable of learning what is 
already known? Or should we try to develop creative and innovative minds capable of 
discovery from preschool age on, throughout life?” At their best, people are curious 
and inspired. They are committed to learning and extending themselves; they are self-
motivated. Theory and practice acknowledge however, that self-concepts are 
vulnerable and can easily be crushed and examples of adults and children who are 
apathetic, alienated and who reject growth are abundant (Ryan & Deci, 2000).  
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The challenge to researchers and educators is how to encourage the creativity and 
curiosity of individual thinking whilst developing the socialized awareness of the 
perspectives and needs of others (Giglio & Perret-Clermont, 2009), in order that they 
might offer the possibility to learn new concepts, ideas and vocabulary. If a child is 
more concerned with the views of others, does he develop independent and creative 
thinking? Furthermore, if children are too eager to accept the ‘truth’ as it is delivered 
by the teacher-authority, will they stop searching when such knowledge is delivered 
in classroom learning contexts? As we have seen, when a child’s thinking is co-
formed to an extreme, it is likely that he will escape the challenge of cognitive 
discussion and even freeze his thinking processes. These children may be able to 
experience and gain perspective from others and they may acquire valuable semiotic 
means but without the capacity to verbalize their in-formed thinking, new 
consciousness, creativity and understanding may be limited.  
Children require an environment where they can rehearse both types of thinking, 
where they can be inspired through their natural sense of curiosity and wonder, to 
raise questions and manage the doubts and discomfort that may arrive in the process 
of reaching an understanding of the answers. Through dialogue, children are enabled 
socially as well as cognitively. In dialogue, young people learn to narrate, to explain, 
to instruct, to ask different types of questions, to listen to and build upon answers, to 
analyze and solve problems, to speculate and imagine, to discuss, to argue, to reason, 
to negotiate, to explore and to evaluate ideas (Hardman & Delafield, 2010). At times, 
reasoning and argumentation may feel uncomfortable and even contradictory in a 
school context which typically promotes helpfulness and co-operation in children 
through various kinds of rules and reinforced expectations based on authority, such 
as: be nice, be helpful, don’t lie, share the pencils, don’t fight and so on. In 
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demanding such social co-operation and conformation of our children, are we 
somehow suppressing their possibilities to develop in-formed, autonomous and 
creative thinking?  
Do teachers themselves need to demonstrate in-formed, autonomous thinking in order 
for children to learn to be autonomous, in-formed thinkers?  In-formed teachers will 
seek out the views of their peers and take these views into consideration. Likewise 
they will need to understand their students' view of the world (César & Kumpulainen, 
2008). They need to be curious and innovative and open to doubt and to new learning. 
Exploring individual curiosity maybe difficult in a class of many and indeed, may 
hardly be accommodated within the demands of the timetable and curriculum 
deliverables. In the classroom, where a teacher is expected to impart information and 
established knowledge, within timely deadlines and in accordance with a pre-defined 
curriculum, managing vulnerability and discomfort may seem wholly inappropriate, 
time-consuming and out of place. However, we believe that teachers who reduce their 
pressure to impose knowledge through encouraging a more democratic and co-
operative approach to classroom activities, can encourage children’s in-formed 
thinking. And as we have learned from Valentin, both researchers and educators may 
need to accept that we may be wrong or that another perspective can be equally true 
or adapted in response to a different context. Despite our discomfort, we may need to 
learn to live with expressed doubts, in the confidence that children can and will learn 
in such moments.  
Conclusion 
Our study raises questions for the reductionist approach to measuring cognitive 
development in isolation. We have demonstrated that thinking doesn’t just happen in 
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a vacuum. Within educational institutions children display tensions and emotional 
reasons to think and respond both as in-formed and co-formed thinkers and a great 
deal that lies in between. As Piaget and his disciples have claimed, we question 
whether a child’s argumentation and reasoning can indeed provide an accurate guide 
for the measurement of cognitive development and if an isolation of cognitive 
processes from contextual elements is truly possible. 
In our quest to better understand the experience of Valentin, who we draw attention to 
here as the unique subject within our corpus, we offer our exploratory thinking for 
others to question, discuss and debate. We acknowledge our doubts and questions, in 
the hope and expectation that if we remain open in dialogue to the suggestions of 
others, we may learn. We would like to know more about the ways by which children 
become capable of convincing themselves and others of their logical reasoning and 
argumentation. In our next steps we will try to understand how creativity and 
innovation can be inspired, encouraged and motivated in children who also manage to 
take account of other’s perspectives and the expectations and norms of the social 
context. 
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Appendix 1: Transcription codes 
. falling intonation 
? rising intonation 
! exclaiming intonation 
,  continuing intonation 
: prolonging of sounds 
A high tone (capital letter) 
(.)  pause (2/10 second or less) 
((abc)) segment added by the transcriber in order to clarify some elements of the 
situation 
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